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Correcting the Error in Gamma Discounting 
by Szabolcs Szekeres 
Abstract: In “Gamma Discounting” Martin L. Weitzman concludes that certainty 
equivalent discount rates should decline significantly over time. He draws this 
conclusion from fitting a Gamma distribution to the responses of 2,160 economists 
asked to give a discount rate estimate and calculating effective discount rates from it. 
This paper shows that Weitzman’s model is based on an erroneous definition of 
expected present value. Correcting the definition changes Weitzman’s conclusions, 
explains the Pazner and Razin discrepancy and solves the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle 
under risk neutrality. The assertions of this paper are corroborated by calculations 
based on data found in Weitzman (2001). 
Keywords: Weitzman-Gollier puzzle; declining discount rates; discounting. 
JEL Codes: D61, H43 
Martin L. Weitzman’s articles “Gamma Discounting” (2001), which followed up on his 
“Why the far-distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible rate?” (1998) are 
arguably the two most important antecedents of the adoption by several countries of his 
recommendation that discount rates should decline over time (DDR). In setting official policy 
on this matter for the UK, The Green Book gives the following arguments: “Where the appraisal 
of a proposal depends materially upon the discounting of effects in the very long term, the 
received view is that a lower discount rate for the longer term (beyond 30 years) should be used. 
The main rationale for declining long-term discount rates results from uncertainty about the 
future. This uncertainty can be shown to cause declining discount rates over time.” (HMT 2003) 
A footnote to the last sentence cites Weitzman (1998) and Weitzman (2001). The OECD (2018) 
Cost-Benefit Analysis manual cites Weitzman’s work and states “it can be shown that the 
certainty-equivalent decreases with time.” 
In its abstract Weitzman (2001) presents the following summary: “A numerical example is 
constructed from the results of a survey based on the opinions of 2,160 economists. The main 
finding is that even if every individual believes in a constant discount rate, the wide spread of 
opinion on what it should be makes the effective social discount rate decline significantly over 
time.” This assertion has two components: (1) that the “effective discount rate” is a declining 
function of time and (2) that it is so because of the wide spread of the opinions received in the 
survey. 
One great advantage of Weitzman (2001) is that it provides the results of the survey, which 
makes it possible to use its own numerical example to check the validity of its claims. This 
paper challenges both of Weitzman’s assertions. Section 1 will address the claim that effective 
discount rates should be declining; Section 2 will process the numerical example, corroborate 
the conclusions of Section 1, and address the claim that the first assertion is the consequence of 
the responses to the survey; Section 3 will present conclusions. 
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1. What is the correct certainty equivalent discount rate? 
Before addressing matters of substance, it is important to define what “effective social 
discount rate” means. In Weitzman (2001) the term effective is used to describe the function 
defined by expression (1) which clearly aims to compute an expected present value. Weitzman 
derives a “certainty equivalent discount rate” in Weitzman (1998) from an expression analogous 
to (1). For this reason, this paper uses the term certainty equivalent discount rate, or more 
briefly, certainty equivalent rate (CER) in the same sense that Weitzman (2001) uses the term 
“effective discount rate.” 
As for the “social” qualifier, we interpret this the same way as the OECD (2018) Cost-
Benefit Analysis manual does: “As long as projects and policies are being evaluated from 
society’s point of view, s is a social discount rate” in the belief that this is the sense given by 
Weitzman to this term. 
As neither Weitzman (1998) nor Weitzman (2001) mentions utility functions, the expected 
present or future values calculated are interpreted as risk neutral, and we assume that the interest 
rates mentioned pertain to some capital market.  
Weitzman (2001) defines “the expected value today of an extra expected dollar at time t” 
as follows: 
 𝐴(𝑡) ≝ ∫ 𝑒–𝑥𝑡∞0  𝑓(𝑥) 𝑑(𝑥) (1) 
where f(x) is a probability density function giving the probability of the interest rate being x. 
For this discussion, we convert the above expression to the expression (2). The only 
difference is that instead of having a continuous probability density function of interest rates x, 
we assume that interest rates can be any {ri} with probability {pi}: 
 𝐴(𝑡) ≝ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡 (2) 
These are alternative forms of the same definition of present value, on which all of 
Weitzman’s conclusions are based. We will show that this definition is wrong. 
The certainty equivalent discount rate that can be derived from (2) is the following1: 
 𝑟𝑤(𝑡) = −(1 𝑡⁄ ) 𝑙𝑛(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖 ) (3) 
Pazner and Razin (1975) had already observed that CERs derived from the expected value 
of discount factors, such as (2), are lower than those that can be derived from the expected value 
of compound factors. We define the expected future value (EFV) of $1, using the same 
terminology as before, as follows: 
 𝐸𝐹𝑉(𝑡) ≝ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 (4) 
The certainty equivalent discount rate that can be derived from (4) is the following: 
 
1
 Superscript w identifies Weitzman’s method, while the asterisk superscript will be used to denote the correct 
method. 
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 𝑟∗ (𝑡) = (1 𝑡⁄ ) 𝑙𝑛(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖 ) (5) 
Gollier (2004) pointed out, thereby launching the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle, that while rw(t) 
is a declining function of time, r*(t) is an increasing one.  
An unstated assumption of Weitzman’s models explains this behavior: interest rates are 
perfectly autocorrelated. This is evident in (2), as for any given scenario i the interest rate will 
be the same ri regardless of the value of t. This creates the following mechanism. For high 
values of ri, distant future values will become very high, far exceeding those resulting from 
lower ris. The disproportionally high contribution to EFVs by higher ris will cause CERs to tend 
to the highest possible interest rate. The same happens in reverse with Weitzman’s proposed 
discounting method. In that case it is the low ris that generate the largest present values and thus 
pull CERs downwards. As these effects get stronger as t increases, rw(t) will decline towards 
the lowest possible ri, whereas r*(t) will increase towards the highest possible ri. 
Regarding rw(t) and r*(t) Pazner and Razin (1975) concludes that “as the two criteria 
discussed here are equally likely, on a priori grounds, to be used as guides to investment 
decision making, and as their use may provide different rankings of investment prospects, 
the question arises as to what is the correct way to approach the problem in general.” The 
confusion resurfaced after Gollier’s (2004) observation. The discrepancy was universally 
regarded as troublesome. Ben Groom, Cameron Hepburn, Phoebe Koundouri and David Pearce 
(2005) characterized the puzzle as follows: 
“So, confusingly, whereas in the absence of uncertainty the two decision criteria are equivalent, once 
uncertainty regarding the discount rate is introduced the appropriate discount rate for use in CBA depends 
upon whether we choose ENPV or ENFV as our decision criterion. In the former case, discount rates are 
declining and in the latter they are rising through time. It is not immediately clear which of these criteria is 
correct.” 
Because rw(t) is derived from a certain future value (FV) and a stochastic EPV, and r*(t) is 
derived from a certain present value (PV) and a stochastic EFV, Gollier (2004) stated that 
“Taking the expected net future value is equivalent to assuming that all risks will be borne by 
the future generation. […] Using the expected net present value implicitly means that it is the 
current generation who bears the risk.” This is a strange remark, given the assumption of risk-
neutrality implicit in the fundamental papers of the puzzle. But Gollier (2016) went further: 
“the risk-neutrality assumption underlying the two discounting rules is technically incompatible 
with an uncertain interest (or discount) rate […] Thus, in order to reconcile the basic ingredient 
of the gamma discounting approach (i.e., uncertain interest rates with economic theory), a 
model with a risk-averse representative agent must be considered.”  
Indeed, most of the literature trying to reconcile the two approaches appeals to the notion 
of risk-aversion, and this is the basis on which Gollier and Weitzman (2010) claimed to have 
solved the puzzle2. 
But this is not how this paper will proceed. Whenever a common set of premises yields 
mathematically conflicting results, either there must be calculation errors, or the premises 
must be inconsistent. We can discard calculation errors; consequently, the puzzle can only 
 
2
 A claim disputed in Szekeres, Sz. (2017) Checking Gollier and Weitzman’s solution of the “Weitzman–Gollier 
puzzle”. 
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be due to conflicting premises. Therefore, we must examine the two definitions: the 
definition EFV and the definition of EPV. 
The EFV of $1 is defined by expression (4), repeated for convenience: 
 𝐸𝐹𝑉(𝑡) ≝ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 (6) 
This expression describes a stochastic process in which the initial $1 is compounded 
alternatively by all possible ris and each of the i results obtained is weighted by the 
corresponding probability pi. As this is simply the application of the definition of expected 
value E[f(x)] = Σ f(xi)pi to f(x) = exp(tx), we will assume that the definition of EFV(t) is 
correct. 
Then it must be A(t), the definition of expected present value used both in Pazner and 
Razin (1975) and in Weitzman (1998, 2001), that is wrong. Odd, given that it also involves 
probability weighting an expression that is correct in deterministic cases, which is why this 
definition has been seldom questioned. But as it is incompatible, none the less, with the 
definition of EFV, it is best to go back to first principles. 
The correct expected present value (EPV) of a future $1 can be derived directly from the 
textbook definition of present value. It is the amount that will compound to the EFV of $1 at 
the going (stochastic) market rate r. If EFV(t) =1, as in (2), then 
  𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ≝ 1 (7) 
It is a fact of mathematics that the correct EPV derived from (7) is the following:  
 𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) = 1 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 (8) 
The correct EPV(t) is different from Weitzman’s A(t), as defined in (2): 
 𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) ≝ 1 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ≠  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡 ≝ A(t) (9) 
It might be difficult to accept that the expected value of the scenario specific discount 
factors does not equal the certainty equivalent discount factor. To help see it, it might be useful 
to closely examine the simplest possible practical example. Let the stochastic ri be one of {r1, 
r2} with probabilities {p1, p2}. Expression (9) then becomes: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) ≝ 1𝑝1𝑒𝑟1𝑡+𝑝2𝑒𝑟2𝑡 ≠ 𝑝1𝑒𝑟1𝑡 + 𝑝2𝑒𝑟2𝑡 ≝ 𝐴(𝑡) (10) 
As exponentiation is not distributive over addition, the following reformulation highlights 
the difference: 
 
(𝑝1𝑒𝑟1𝑡 + 𝑝2𝑒𝑟2𝑡)−1 ≠ 𝑝1(𝑒𝑟1𝑡)−1 + 𝑝2(𝑒𝑟2𝑡)−1 (11) 
A numerical example will help illustrate why Weitzman CERs are lower than those 
obtained from correct discounting, and support an argument made in Section II. Following with 
the two states of the world example, let’s assume that p1 = p2 = 0.5, and taking numbers from 
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Weitzman (2001), let us assume that r1 = one percent, the lowest survey response that was 
higher than zero, and r2 = 27 percent , the highest response received, and let t = 300. 
The marginal or instantaneous discount rate corresponding to A(t) for any time t can be 
calculated using equation (8) in Weitzman (2001), which takes the following form with our 
two-states of the world example: 
 𝑅(𝑡) = − ?̇?(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) = − −𝑝1𝑟1𝑒−𝑟1𝑡− 𝑝2𝑟2𝑒−𝑟2𝑡 𝑝1𝑒−𝑟1𝑡+ 𝑝2𝑒−𝑟2𝑡  (12) 
Using the assumed values of the numerical example we get: 
 𝑅𝑤(300) = − −0.50.01𝑒3  − 0.50.27𝑒810.5𝑒3  + 0.5 𝑒81 = 0.01 (13) 
where the first exponent of e is the product of t and r1 (300 0.01 = 3) and the second is the 
product of t and r2 (300 0.27 = 81). Notice that r2 in the numerator is weighted by 1/e81, which 
means that the higher interest rate hardly contributes to the result.  
Proceeding the same way for EPV(t), we get the following after differentiating and 
simplifying: 
 𝑅∗(300) = 𝑝1𝑟1𝑒𝑟1𝑡+ 𝑝2𝑟2𝑒𝑟2𝑡 𝑝1𝑒𝑟1𝑡+ 𝑝2𝑒𝑟2𝑡 = 0.005𝑒3+0.135𝑒810.5𝑒3+0.5𝑒81 = 0.27 (14) 
where the factors in the numerator are the probability weighted interest rates assumed. Notice 
that in this case it is the low interest rate that has hardly any weight, and therefore the result is 
equal to the higher rate. 
The Weitzman discounting CER that corresponds to the assumptions of the example can 
be calculated using expression (3) and is the following: 
 𝑟𝑤(300) = −(1 300⁄ ) 𝑙𝑛 (0.5𝑒3 + 0.5𝑒81) = 0.012 (15) 
The CER calculated by the correct discounting method can be derived from (8) and is the 
same r*(t) that is defined by (5). 
 𝑟∗ (300) = (1 300⁄ ) 𝑙𝑛(0.5𝑒3 + 0.5𝑒81) = 0.268 (16) 
The fact that Rw(300) < rw(t) shows that Weitzman CERs decline as a function of time, 
while that R*(300) > r*(t) indicates that correct CERs are a growing function of time.  
In this very same context, Pazner and Razin (1975) already observed that by Jensen’s 
inequality rw(t) < r*(t), which the above numerical example confirms. Given that both rates 
have been defined for the same EFV(t) = $1, their relative magnitude implies the following, 
since a lower rate implies a higher present value: 
  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡 >  1 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 (17) 
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While the cause of this inequality is clear, what explains the magnitude of the difference 
between the two sides of the inequality? Let us define random variable X to be exp(rit) and 
random variable Y to be 1/exp(rit). The expected values of random values X and Y are related 
as follows: 
 𝐸[𝑋𝑌] =   𝐸[𝑋]𝐸[𝑌] + 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌)  (18) 
Given that E[XY] = 1 because Y is the reciprocal of X, we can rearrange (18) as follows: 
 𝐸[𝑌] =   1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋,𝑌)𝐸[𝑋]   (19) 
which means that 
  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡 =   1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣( 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡,   𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡   (20) 
This relationship will be corroborated in Section II with data from Weitzman (2001). The 
difference between Weitzman’s A(t) and the correct EPV(t) is not a puzzle, but the predictable 
difference between an incorrect and the correct definition of EPV. 
If the right-hand side of (17) is the correct EPV(t), why would anyone choose the left-hand 
side, A(t), to define it? Possibly because it would make no difference if the covariance in (20) 
were equal to zero. In other words, if there were no uncertainty, it would be true that: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) =  𝑒−𝑥𝑡 (21) 
To convert (21) into a stochastic expression by making x a random variable to be 
probability weighted is risky when x is the argument of a nonlinear function. It turns out that to 
be a mistake in this case. This is the seductive trap into which Weitzman and many others fell. 
Expression (1) is a fallacy because the expected value of the inverses is not equal to the inverse 
of the expected value. 
That A(t) is not the correct certainty equivalent discount factor is proven by the fact that 
A(t) does not compound to the assumed EFV(t) of 1, thus violating the definition of present 
value: 
  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ≠ 1 (22) 
Both the Pazner and Razin discrepancy and the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle disappear when 
the textbook definition of expected present value is used. Notice that while the EFV definition 
describes the process of compounding, the correct EPV definition merely states “find a value 
EPV(t) such that it compounds to value EFV(t),” without defining a computational procedure 
of its own. There can be no conflict between the two definitions, as the same computational 
procedure is used for both compounding and discounting, in which taking a reciprocal is the 
only additional step. EPV(t) and EFV(t) only differ in proportion to a positive constant: the 
expected compound factor. For this reason, the NPV and NFV investment rules cannot conflict. 
When correctly calculated, they will only differ by a positive factor, which ensures their 
equivalency.  
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EPV(t) could also be found by numerical methods, to any desired degree of precision, 
iterating until the compounded value of EPV(t) equals EFV(t). Correctly calculated EPV(t) and 
EFV(t) pairs will always be congruent and will always be related to each other by the following 
expression: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑉(𝑡) = 𝐸𝐹𝑉(𝑡) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 (23) 
No value other than the above EPV(t) is the present value of EFV(t). Weitzman’s A(t), 
which uses a different computational procedure, is therefore not the present value of EFV(t). 
For a conceptual interpretation of what Weitzman’s A(t) actually computes, see Szekeres 
(2017). 
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that expression (1), the premise of Weitzman 
(2001), is wrong. Correct results can only be derived from the following expression: 
 𝐴(𝑡) ≝ 1∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑡∞0  𝑓(𝑥) 𝑑(𝑥) (24) 
Further, only CERs derived from (24) would be congruent with the assumed future values 
of $1 for all time horizons. Using R(t), the marginal discount rate, as Weitzman proposed, would 
produce incongruent (lower) results. 
These findings will be empirically corroborated in the next Section using the survey 
responses reported on in Weitzman (2001). The error introduced by using marginal discount 
rates instead of CERs will be shown in Appendix A. 
2. Results of the correct and incorrect discounting methods 
Weitzman’s (2001) reports on the results of a survey of 2,160 economists who were asked 
to name the real interest rate to be used in appraising climate change mitigation projects. The 
responses ranged between –3 percent and 27 percent. Weitzman fitted a Gamma distribution to 
the responses received, as in Figure 1, and proceeded to compute marginal discount rates. He 
used the Weitzman discounting method implicit in incorrect expression (1).  
We repeated the calculations using both the Weitzman and the correct discounting 
methods. For transparency and ease of replicability, we used the discrete probability distribution 
derived from the raw survey responses, without the intervening step of fitting a Gamma 
distribution, which is not essential to test the basic claim of Weitzman (2001), namely that 
CERs are a declining function of time3. We discarded the three negative interest rate responses4. 
The calculations, computing expressions (3) and (5) with the survey data, are straightforward 
and easy to follow in the accompanying Excel5 workbook, so no details are included here. 
 
3
 See Appendix A for a comparison between the results obtained using the frequency distribution of responses 
directly with those obtained using Weitzman’s fitted Gamma distribution. 
4
 Weitzman probably did the same, for two reasons: (1) negative interest rates are explicitly ruled out in Weitzman 
(1998) and (2) the Gamma distribution is not defined for negative values. Leaving the negative observations in 
would result in negative CERs for large enough values of t when using Weitzman discounting. 
5
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As will be shown below, the actual content 
of the probability distribution used is of no 
consequence. In Footnote 5, page 264, 
Weitzman (2001) states “To the extent that 
some panel members may believe in declining 
discount rates, the basic conclusions of this 
paper will only be strengthened. In this spirit, 
the main conclusion might be stated as follows: 
Even if everyone believes in a constant 
discount rate, the effective discount rate 
declines strongly over time.” This is true. Any 
probability distribution will do so, regardless 
of its skewness value, provided Weitzman 
discounting is used. The expression “Gamma 
discounting” is a misnomer therefore, for the fitted Gamma distribution only describes the 
distribution of survey results, not the method of discounting, which is Weitzman’s.  
The differences between the correct and 
incorrect calculation results are huge, and the 
correct results invalidate the conclusion of 
Weitzman (2001) that “society should be 
using effective discount rates that decline 
from a mean value of, say, around 4 percent 
per annum for the immediate future down to 
around zero for the far-distant future.” 
Weitzman’s year 300 CER is 1.2 percent, but 
the correct value is 24.5 percent. Figure 2 
shows how the Weitzman and correct discount 
factors change as a function of time, and 
Figure 3 depicts the corresponding CERs. In 
both figures the values corresponding to the 
deterministic average interest rate of 3.96 
percent are shown. 
Weitzman’s assertion that it is “the very 
wide spread of professional opinion on 
discount rates” that causes CERs to be a 
negative function of time is untrue, as only the 
most extreme values matter. If we invert the 
survey results by attributing the response 
frequency of the highest interest rate to the 
lowest, and so on in sequence, in effect 
flipping the distribution horizontally, 
Weitzman’s CERs still decline monotonically 
and tend towards the lowest possible value. 
Figure 4 shows the inverted frequency distribution of responses and Figure 5 the 
corresponding CERs. Inverting the frequency distribution increases the mean value of the 
observations from 3.96 percent to 20.4 percent. Consequently, the correctly calculated CERs 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
s
Real Discount Rate (percent)
Survey Responses
Fitted Gamma
distibution
FIGURE 1. ACTUAL AND FITTED FREQUENCY 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
D
is
co
u
n
t 
ra
te
Years
Correct CERs
Average interest CERs
Weitzman CERs
FIGURE 2. WEITZMAN AND CORRECT DISCOUNT 
FACTORS 
FIGURE 3. WEITZMAN AND CORRECT CERS 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
D
is
co
u
n
t 
fa
ct
o
r
Years
Correct discount
factors
Corresponding to
average interest
Weitzman discount
factors
9 
 
increase from the mean, reflecting the yield-
boosting effect of the perfect correlation 
assumption, while Weitzman’s CERs decline 
towards the lowest possible interest rate, which 
is still zero percent. This low value now has a 
lower probability than before, so it will take 
longer for Weitzman CERs to converge to it, 
but they will get there eventually, regardless of 
how all respondents other than those whose 
answer was zero percent opined.  
The numerical example of Section I bears 
out this conclusion. In the equiprobable two-
scenario example rw(300) was 1.2 percent, the 
same as the CER calculated from the 
frequency distribution of survey responses. 
It is easy to check in the accompanying 
Excel workbook that Weitzman discounting 
is inconsistent with the definition of present 
value. For example, discounting a safe $1 due 
in year 100 has a Weitzman expected “present 
value” of $0.103895747 (The correct value is 
2.47E-09). Compounding that amount with 
the same probability distribution of interest 
rates yields an expected future amount of 
$42,108,494. This kind of inconsistency 
never happens with correctly calculated 
expected discount factors because they are the 
inverses of the corresponding expected 
compound factors. Consequently, all correctly calculated EPV(t) compound to the EFV(t) of 
$1. 
We can corroborate the validity of expression (20) of Section 1 by using the computed 
values for year 100. The requisite expected compound factor and covariance are calculated in 
the accompanying Excel workbook. 
  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡 =   1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑣( 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡,   𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑡) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1 −(−42108493)405295645.4 = 0.103895747  (25) 
This result, already cited above, confirms that the magnitude of the error in Weitzman 
discounting can be readily computed and is not a puzzle. 
The results obtained from replicating Weitzman’s calculations with both his discounting 
method and the correct one allows us to draw the following conclusions: 
1. Weitzman’s discounting method is incorrect, because it does not correctly calculate the 
present values of future sums. This is demonstrated by the fact that his calculated results 
do not compound back to the amount originally discounted. 
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2. Weitzman’s recommendation that “society should be using effective discount rates that 
decline” with time is not a correct conclusion from his model and the survey data he 
employed. The opposite is true based on his assumptions: CERs should be increasing. 
3. Weitzman’s assertion that his conclusions derive from the “the wide spread of opinion” 
in the survey is untrue. Ultimately only the opinion of those giving the lowest response 
matters. 
3.  Conclusions 
In the preceding two sections we have shown that Weitzman (2001) is wrong in its two 
principal claims: (1) based on his data and assumptions, CERs should not be declining, but 
increasing, and (2) his claimed result was not a reflection of the diversity of opinions of the 
2,160 economist surveyed, but is an intrinsic property of his discounting method. 
The fundamental flaw in Weitzman (2001) is that it is premised on an incorrect definition 
of expected present value. Once this is recognized and remedied, the correct results emerge. 
Both the Pazner and Razin discrepancy and the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle disappear when the 
textbook definition of expected present value is used. No consideration of risk aversion is 
germane to the original puzzle. 
Weitzman’s model is certainly not characteristic of any real capital market from which the 
opportunity cost of capital could be derived for the appraisal of real-world projects, so the 
correct results shown above are not a basis for advocating increasing discount rates. Further, 
arguments other than Weitzman’s have been advanced for DDRs, and those are not addressed 
here. But the problem with Weitzman’s DDR proposal is that it suffers from a double burden: 
it assumes an unrealistic degree of autocorrelation of interest rates and uses an incorrect 
calculation method. His recommendations should not be followed. 
Weitzman’s results caused well founded unease for some: how could a market 
characterized by the yield-boosting effect of perfectly autocorrelated interest rates yield 
declining CERs? But his results might have been welcomed by others, those eager to find a 
solution to the problem that many dubbed the “tyranny of the present over the future associated 
with constant rate discounting” (Groom et al 2005). Expression (1) was taken to be a definition; 
it had not yet been recognized to be a fallacy6. And Gollier and Weitzman (2010) claimed to 
have solved the puzzle leaving the DDR recommendation intact. 
“The successful deployment and dissemination of DDRs suggests that, for better or worse, 
academic economists can enslave practical men with economic ideas.” (Groom and Cameron, 
2017) Regrettably, it was for worse in this case. There are always twists and turns in science, 
however, and it is better to correct errors than to let them remain undetected. 
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Appendix A 
In this Appendix we compare the results obtained in our calculations based on the 
frequency distribution of the survey responses to those that can be calculated using the formulas 
developed in Weitzman (2001) with the parametrization of the Gamma distribution that it 
contains. 
Weitzman (2001) shows that the solution of the integral in expression (1) of the main text, 
after f(x) has been replaced by the Gamma distribution with parameters α and β, is the following: 
 𝐴(𝑡) = ( 𝛽𝛽+𝑡)𝛼 (26) 
The values of α and β relate to the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of the observed 
frequency distribution of responses in the following way: 
 𝛼 = 𝜇2𝜎2 (27) 
 𝛽 = 𝜇𝜎2 (28) 
The expected value A(t) can be computed by reference the statistical descriptors of the survey 
responses as follows: 
 𝐴(𝑡) = 1(1+𝑡𝜎2/𝜇)𝜇2 𝜎2⁄  (29) 
As A(t) is the “present value” calculated by Weitzman’s method, the corresponding CER 
can be computed from the following: 
 𝑒−𝑡𝑟𝑡𝑤 = 1(1+𝑡𝜎2/𝜇)𝜇2 𝜎2⁄  (30) 
From which: 
 𝑟𝑤(𝑡) = − 1𝑡 𝑙𝑛 ( 1(1+𝑡𝜎2/𝜇)𝜇2 𝜎2⁄ ) (31) 
Taking µ = 3.96 percent and σ = 2.94 percent we calculated the rw(t) that are comparable 
to the ones we calculated from the frequency distribution of responses. 
This is not how Weitzman calculated his proposed discount rates, however, even though 
this is the method that gives the exact CER corresponding to (1). Instead, he calculated the 
marginal discount rate using the following (equation 22 in Weitzman 2001), which will yield 
lower values than rw(t), as Table 1 shows.  
 𝑅𝑤(𝑡) = 𝜇(1+𝑡𝜎2/𝜇) (32) 
Even with correct discounting, the marginal discount rate ought not be used for 
discounting, as it would not ensure the congruence between EPV(t) and EFV(t). For 
comparability we computed Rw(t) retaining the same µ = 3.96 percent and σ = 2.94 percent 
values, even though Weitzman rounded both up to 4 and 3 percent, respectively. 
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Table 1 compares the variously calculated CERs and marginal discount rates for selected 
years. The results are presented in the following sequence: rw(t) from the frequency distribution 
based calculation, rw(t) from equation (31), R(t) from equation (32) and, for reference, r*(t) 
from the frequency distribution based calculation. 
TABLE 1 – COMPARISON OF DISCOUNT RATES (IN PERCENT) 
 
Calculation based on incorrect EPV definition 
 
Correct 
Def. 
 rw(t) rw(t) Rw(t)  r*(t) 
 
Freq. Gamma Gamma 
 
Freq. 
Year
s 
Dist. Eq. 31 Eq. 32 
 
Dist. 
10 3.6 3.6 3.3 
 
4.5 
20 3.3 3.3 2.8 
 
5.7 
30 3.1 3.0 2.4 
 
7.9 
40 3.0 2.8 2.1 
 
10.9 
50 2.8 2.7 1.9 
 
13.6 
60 2.7 2.5 1.7 
 
15.6 
70 2.6 2.4 1.6 
 
17.0 
80 2.5 2.3 1.4 
 
18.2 
90 2.4 2.2 1.3 
 
19.1 
100 2.3 2.1 1.2 
 
19.8 
150 1.9 1.8 0.9 
 
22.1 
200 1.6 1.5 0.7 
 
23.2 
250 1.4 1.4 0.6 
 
24.0 
300 1.2 1.2 0.5 
 
24.5 
By comparing the first two columns we can see that the rates are nearly the same, which is 
not surprising given the good fit of the Gamma distribution to the survey responses. However, 
it is not the shape of the Gamma distribution that is responsible for this agreement. The observed 
rw(300) = 1.2 was also obtained in the two states of the world numerical example of Section 1. 
It is only the values of the lowest observations that matter in Weitzman discounting. 
Weitzman’s recommendation to use Rw(t) instead of rw(t) is wrong, as it understates the 
applicable discount rate. For year 300 it is less than half of the corresponding rw(t), which is 
also wrong, of course. The correct result for year 300, derived from Weitzman’s assumptions 
and the survey results, is 24.5 percent. 
